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Integrating Subchapters K and S and Beyond
Walter D. Schwidetzky*
INTRODUCTION

This Article builds upon a similar, lengthier effort that I
published in the Tax Lawyer in 2009.1 While there is overlap,
this Article contains much new materiaL Important case law and
tax proposals from the House Ways and Means Committee have
come out in the interim. Due to space limitations, unlike my Tax
Lawyer effort, this Article attempts to avoid prolixity. It assumes
the reader has good knowledge of both Subchapters Sand K and
the tax entity selection process. If you are not that reader, a
review of my Tax Lawyer article or Professor Mann's article in
this symposium edition2 will fill in the gaps. Generally speaking,
I recommend repealing Subchapter S, but integrating its more
legitimate benefits into Subchapter K. I also make Subchapter K
available to most nonpublic C corporations, putting most closely
held businesses on a level playing field.
Part I of this Article provides some context and in a fairly
summary fashion reviews the tax advantages that S corporations
have over partnerships. Part II looks at income from services and
capital and the use of S corporations to avoid self-employment
taxes. Part III looks at the possibility of repealing Subchapter K
instead of S. Part IV takes a brief look at the nuts and bolts of
how my proposal would be implemented. Part V recommends
that nonpublic corporations be also allowed to elect Subchapter
K, albeit with some continued potential for double taxation in
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. This Article was written
with the benefit of a research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law, for
which I am grateful. Thanks to the following persons for their helpful comments:
Professor Fred Brown, University of Baltimore School of Law; Professor Roberta Mann,
University of Oregon School of Law; Jeff Markowitz, Esq. of Miles and Stockbridge in
Baltimore, MD; Payson Peabody, Esq., Managing Director and Tax Counsel, SIFMA;
Robert Rombro, Esq. of Baltimore, MD; Professor Martin Schnall, Boston University
School of Law; and Professor Jay Soled, Rutgers University School of Law. Also, thanks to
the participants of the Chapman Law Review Symposium "Business Tax Reform:
Emerging Issues in the Taxation of U.S. Entities" and the 16th Annual Critical Tax
Theory Conference at the University of Baltimore. I presented my paper to both groups
and received very helpful feedback.
1 Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters Sand K-Just Do It, 62 TAX
LAw. 749 (2009) [hereinafter Tax Lawyer article].
2 See Roberta Mann, Subchapter S: Vive Ie Difference!, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 65 (2014).
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accordance with current sections 1368 and 1374, and Part VI
looks at the pass-through reform proposals of the House Ways
and Means Committee chaired by Congressman David Camp
("the Camp Proposals") which came out in 2013 as well as the
House Ways and Means' massive Tax Reform Act of 2014 ("TRA
2014") (hence the "and Beyond" part of the title).
While I will review the tax advantages of S corporations, I
generally do not review the tax advantages of tax partnerships, a
decidedly longer list. That said, I will make note of two
advantages of Subchapter K that I believe are of special
importance. One is special allocations, which play a very
important role in structuring business transactions. Under
section 704(b), partnerships are allowed to allocate items of
income and deduction in a manner that is at variance with the
underlying ownership of the partnership interests. Thus,
someone who is otherwise a 10% partner could be allocated 50%
of depreciation deductions. Or, more significantly, the "money
partners" can be allocated all of the losses until some form of
break-even and then, for example, divide income equally with the
''brain partners." Or, also importantly, large capital contributors
may get a preferential return on their capital. The ability to
make special allocations plays an important role in getting
business deals off the ground. It might be reason by itself to
prefer Subchapter K to Subchapter S (where such allocations are
not possible). Some have proposed systems that would eliminate
special allocations, because of validly perceived abuses that often
occur in the special allocation system. 3 But in my view, the
answer is to reform section 704(b), not to kill it.4 Special
allocations simply play too valuable a role in everyday business
deals, and a lot of business would not get done without them.
The second advantage is section 752, which permits
partner-level debt to increase owner-level basis. Subchapter S
does not have a section 752 analog, and that creates major
problems for business, as well as traps for the unwary. To endrun the problem, S corporation businesses need to have the
shareholders borrow the money and contribute or lend it to the
corporation. That is in and of itself a little clunky, but becomes a
major problem if the debt needs to be secured by S corporation

3 See id.; GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAw INST., TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 371-77 (1999) [hereinafter ALI REPORT).
4 One cogent reform would be to eliminate special allocations for related parties. See
Emily Cauble & Gregg Polsky, Taxing Partnership Allocations Among Related Parties
(Apr. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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assets, as is commonly the case. While resolvable, this creates
significant secured transaction headaches. 5
Having two pass-through tax regimes creates obvious
administrative and other inefficiencies. There was a time when S
corporations served a valuable purpose, particularly when
taxpayers needed a fairly simple and foolproof pass-through
entity that provided a liability shield. But limited liability
companies (''LLCs''), which are usually taxed as partnerships, 6 in
most contexts make S corporations obsolete. LLCs too can be
fairly simple and foolproof, while providing the superior tax
benefits of the partnership provisions of Subchapter K. 7 The
advent and popularity of LLCs means that the inefficiency
created by two separate pass-through tax regimes can no longer
be justified.
It has been difficult to justify Subchapter S for some time. In
1996, I published my first article recommending the repeal of
Subchapter S.8 It has been almost twenty years, and I am still at
it. There has been the occasional moment of encouragement
along the way. In a rather novel experience for a law professor, in
2004 there was a bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 4137)
that would have, among other things, enacted my proposal. 9 The
bill, however, never became law (or got much of anywhere in the
House) and the tax system remains saddled with both tax
partnerships and S corporations. H.R. 4137 is discussed in detail
in my Tax Lawyer article, but not in this effort.
1. S CORPORATION PLUSES AND WHAT TO Do WITH THEM
S corporations offer a number of legitimate benefits not
currently available to tax partnerships, and those benefits should
be incorporated into Subchapter K. Some derive from the simple
fact that the S corporation is a corporation. For example, parties
who anticipate a public offering often use an S corporation, as it
is a simple matter to convert it to a C corporation prior to the
public offering. While there are publicly traded limited
partnerships and LLCs, corporations are much more popular
with investors, and the overwhelming majority of publicly traded
entities are corporations.

5 See James A. Fellows, Shareholder Basis in the S Corporation: Debt Guarantees
and Loans from Commonly Controlled Entities, 10 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 25, 25-33
(2007).
6 See Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-3(b) (as amended 2006).
7 See Tax Lawyer article, supra note 1, at 759-81.
8 Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15
VA. TAX REV. 591 (1996) [hereinafter S Corp Burial).
9 H.R. 4137, 108th Congo (2004).
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A partnership can make the transition to a corporation, but
it can be a hazardous process. The partnership must first
incorporate and then make the public offering of the stock. There
may be state law barriers, including transfer taxes. Generally,
section 351(a) permits incorporations on a tax-free basis. An
issue, however, is whether the requirements of section 351(a) and
its 80% control are met. It would normally be met on the initial
incorporation, but does the subsequent public offering have to be
collapsed together with the incorporation, and if so, does that
break the 80% test? The answer to the first question typically is
yes, unless there is no binding agreement to engage in the public
offering at the time of the incorporation. The answer to the
second question is typically no, as long as sufficient public
moneys flow into the corporation so that the 80% control test is
still met,lO But other contexts are more problematic. An
incorporation followed by a reorganization has been held to
violate the section 351(a) requirement.ll How can the needs of
the parties making these and similar uses of S corporations be
met in a world without Subchapter S? The solution I propose is
twofold. One part of the solution is to make it easier for
partnerships to incorporate under state law. States should
cooperate in this regard by providing conversion statutes which
permit parties to change entities through a legal, one-step
conversion, without formally having to liquidate one entity and
transfer the assets to another. This approach would, for example,
avoid state income and transfer taxes. The other is to revise the
Code so that non-cash out, post-incorporation transactions will
not run afoul of sections 351(a) or 368,12

10 There was a common understanding that a binding agreement was necessary (to,
for example, engage in a public offering) for the step transaction doctrine to be applied to
collapse section 351 transfers, based on Revenue Ruling 78-294 (and particularly the
holding in that ruling on a firm commitment underwriting that was not pre-sold). Rev.
Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141. However, at the time of the regulatory amendment to
section 351 in 1996, the IRS rendered obsolete Revenue Ruling 78-294, and some
commentators have viewed that action as signaling that the IRS might now apply a more
expansive step transaction test to post-incorporation transfers. See MARTIN D. GINSBURG
& JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ~ 608.3.3.4 (2014). Thanks to
Professor Martin Schnall of Boston University Law School for his observations in this
regard. See Tax Lawyer article, supra note 1, at 769-84; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(3) (1996).
11 See Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. Note, however, that Revenue Ruling 2003-51
takes out some of the bite. Rev. Rul. 2003-51, 2003-1 C.B. 938. It both affirms and
distinguishes Revenue Ruling 70-140, and surprisingly concludes that the control test of
section 351(a) is met, notwithstanding a pre-incorporation binding agreement to dispose
of the stock, if the taxpayer could have gotten to the same end result tax-free using a
different series of steps.
12 The section 368 reorganization provisions should be amended to make clear that
they apply even if the participating corporation has recently incorporated. This
amendment is necessary to deal with an attack from the other end of the transaction.
While the focus of the rulings to date has been on section 351, there also could be an
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Another advantage of an S corporation over a partnership is
the so-called capital gain freeze technique. This normally
presupposes a taxpayer who owns real estate that is a capital
asset13 with substantial, inherent long-term capital gains. If the
property is sold before development, these gains are taxed at
favorable rates. In the case of raw land, for example, the rate
commonly is 15%.14 If instead the taxpayer subdivides and
develops the land, selling the lots individually, all of the gain on
the sales is ordinary income, including the gain inherent in the
property before development. Property held for sale in the
ordinary course of a trade or business does not qualify as a
capital asset, even if it was a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer previously.15
There is currently a solution to this unhappy state of affairs.
Before development, the taxpayer can sell the property to an S
corporation the taxpayer (typically) controls. The S corporation
then develops and sells the lots. The S corporation's gain on the
sale of the lots is ordinary income, but the pre-development gain
is locked in as long-term capital gain to the taxpayer by dint of
the taxable sale to the S corporation. 16 The S corporation takes a
fair market value basis in the property upon purchase. 17 It is
very unlikely that the S corporation can be funded with sufficient
cash to be able to pay for the property outright. Most likely the S
corporation pays with promissory notes that are payable in the
future as the S corporation collects revenues from the sale of the
lots. Under the installment sale rules of section 453, normally the
selling taxpayer only has to recognize his long-term capital gain

argument, for example, that the B reorganization stock-for-stock swap rules are not met if
the stock comes from a recently incorporated partnership. The Service could argue the flip
side of Revenue Ruling 70-140, that in substance the acquiring corporation is not
swapping its stock for stock, but its stock for assets.
13 It is also possible for the property to be a section 1231 asset, which includes real
property used in a trade or business. If a taxpayer's gains from section 1231 assets exceed
his losses from those assets, all the gains and all the losses are generally characterized as
long-term capital gains and losses. It is probably more common for the property
pre-development to be a capital asset.
14 LR.C. § l(h)(l)(C) (2012).
15 See LR.C. § 1221(a)(1); Mauldin v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952). Section
1237 contains a fairly minor exception.
16 LR.C. § 1001(c). Query whether section 269 could be applied to stop this
technique. It seems unlikely. Section 269 appears to be mostly an anti-abuse rule. Here
the taxpayer is just getting the same tax treatment he would have gotten on the sale to a
third party. There is no tax arbitrage going on. Generally, the Code specifically regulates
related party transactions, and if they are not regulated, I would think the presumption
would be that they are allowed. Also, when the Code regulates them, it is, as in sections
1239 or 707(b)(2), to change the character, not ignore the transaction. Thanks to Professor
Jay Soled of Rutgers University School of Law for bringing this issue to my attention.
17 LR.C. § 1012.
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as the notes are paid.1 8 A heavily indebted corporation with a
high debt to equity ratio sometimes has to worry about the debt
being reclassified as equity.19 This is not generally a problem in
the S corporation context, however, as long as the debt meets the
"[s]traight debt safe harbor."20
A taxpayer cannot ordinarily achieve this result by selling
the property to a tax partnership. Section 707(b)(2) treats a
partner's gain as ordinary income if the partner sells property to
a partnership which, in the hands of the partnership, is not a
capital asset, and the partner directly or indirectly owns more
than 50% of the capital or profits interest in the partnership.21
The selling partner, perhaps with other related parties,
commonly controls the partnership, and the property in the
hands of the partnership is not a capital asset as the partnership
uses it in the business of development. 22 Section 707(b)(2) is
generally said to be designed to prevent the following tax
arbitrage: The sale gives the partnership a fair market value
basis in the property. The likely cost to the related partner seller
is long-term capital gains taxed at low rates (but for section
707(b)(2)). Further, the partnership can now depreciate the
property from the new, higher basis. 23 At times the tax benefits of
the higher basis to the partnership offset the tax cost to the
related selling partner. The risk of tax arbitrage is highly
unlikely when the sale is of real property. The depreciation rates
for improvements to real property are quite long-27.5 years for
residential property and 39 years for commercial property.24
Usually, only a mathematically-challenged partner accepts the
tax burden of the sale gain today in exchange for a series of
relatively small annual depreciation supplements to the
partnership for many years in the future. Further, the real
property involved in capital gain freezes probably is most often
raw land, which is not depreciable at all. If the sale, on the other
See section 453(e) for limitations that do not usually pose problems.
See BORIS 1. BI'ITKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ~ 4.02 (7th ed. 2000).
20 See 1.R.C. § 1361(c)(5). The debt must be sum certain payable on demand or on a
specified date, the interest rate cannot be contingent on profits or the borrower's
discretion, the debt cannot be convertible into stock, and the creditor must be an
individual, an estate or trust that is qualified to be an S corporation shareholder, or a
professional lender .
21 The constructive ownership rules of section 267 apply for purposes of determining
whether a partner meets the ownership test. These rules would, for example, attribute
partnership interests owned by certain family members to the selling partners. See 1.R.C.
§ 707(b)(3).
22 See 1.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). The lots held for sale are also not capital assets. See 1.R.C.
§ 1221(a)(1).
23 Section 707(b)(2) overlaps with section 1239.
24 I.R.C. § 168(c).
18
19
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hand, is of an apartment building which the parties want to
convert to condominiums, the gain equal to depreciation
previously taken is typically taxed at a fairly high rate, 25%,
making the tax arbitrage more uneconomical and more
unlikely.25
It is not apparent why existing, inherent capital gains should
be converted to inherent ordinary income when the use of the
property changes. It is appropriate that future appreciation be
taxed in a manner that is consistent with the nature of the new
use, but not past appreciation. This raises the question of
whether an overarching solution should be found that would
apply across the board and not just in the partnership context. 26
That is worth considering, though it is beyond the scope of this
Article.
To bring some rationality to Subchapter K in this regard and
further integrate Subchapters Sand K, at a minimum, section
707(b)(2) should be amended to provide that it only applies to
sales of personal property.27 With this change, the capital gain
freeze technique for real property could be implemented with a
partnership.
S corporations are also often used to illegitimately reduce or
eliminate Social Security and Medicare taxes. There is important
new case law in this area which makes a bad problem potentially
worse. Of course, the elimination of S corporations will end this
abuse. I discuss this topic in detail next.

25 See I.R.C. § 167; Simon v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also I.R.C. §
1(h)(I)(D).
26 Why require any long-term capital gain that arose while property was held as an
investment to be converted into ordinary income when the property is converted to a
different purpose? Why require taxpayers to go through the fiction of a sale? Well, in
truth, there could be practical problems. In the classroom, we can make our numbers up,
but in the real world, it is hard to know with certainty what the value is at the time
property is converted to another use. Also, how will the fisc know if property is truly being
held for investment? The current rule effectively requiring a sale to an S corporation (and
under my proposal, to a partnership) has the advantage of setting a heralding, reportable
event that the Service can audit and upon which it can reach an independent jUdgment.
Another possible solution that does not require a sale is to require a minim urn holding
period for the property during the investment phase where no significant development
takes place, perhaps five years, with an appraisal to be done at the time of conversion by
an independently licensed and unrelated appraiser. See I.R.C. § 1237.
27 A conforming change would need to be made to section 1239.
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II. INCOME FROM SERVICES, INCOME FROM CAPITAL, AND THE
NESEDODGE
A.

Some Background
Section 1401 imposes a tax on "net earning from self
employment" ("NESE"). The tax has two components. One
component is for "old-age, survivors, and disability insurance,"
commonly known as Social Security. The tax is 12.4% of NESE.
The maximum NESE to which it applies is $117,000 in 2014. 28
The other component is for hospital insurance, commonly known
as Medicare, and is 2.9% of NESE and applies to all of a
taxpayer's NESE. There is no dollar limit. 29 Additionally, the
Affordable Care Act added section 1401(b)(2)(A), which imposes a
0.9% tax on NESE for persons earning over $200,000 if they are
single, or $250,000 if they are married. The Affordable Care Act
also added section 1411, which imposes a 3.8% tax on net
investment income for persons with "modified adjusted gross
income" in excess of those thresholds. 3D Importantly in the S
corporation context, net investment income does not include
income from an activity in which the taxpayer materially
participates. 31
NESE is defined as "gross income derived by an individual
from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the
deductions ... attributable to such trade or business, plus his
distributive share ... of income or loss ... from any trade or
business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member ."32
NESE does not include certain kinds of passive income, including
portfolio income, capital gain, and similar income ("Excluded
Income").33 I will discuss this in more detail below, but note that
in this definition all partnership income other than Excluded
Income is included in NESE.
The Social Security and Medicare taxes apply differently to
employers and employees. They apply to "wages," that is,
compensation to an employee for services rendered. 34 The

This amount is adjusted for inflation. See I.R.S. Notice 1036 (Dec. 2013).
Individuals are entitled to a trade or business deduction equal to one-half of the
self-employment tax. LR.C. §§ 164(f), 62(a)(1).
30 "Surviving spouses" fall under the higher threshold. LR.C. § 1411(b)(1). Modified
adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income after adding back in the section 911
exclusion. I.R.C. § 1411(d).
31 I.R.C. § 1411(c)(2).
32 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
33 Id. Among the exclusions are certain rentals from real estate, most dividends,
certain interest, and certain property gains (typically from the sale of capital assets). See
id. Certain retirement payments are also excluded. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(10).
34 The statutory phrase is "remuneration for employment." See I.R.C. § 3121(a).
28
29
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employer and the employee each pay one-half of the Social
Security and Medicare taxes. The total tax is the same as it is for
the self-employed. Thus, the tax that the employer and employee
each pay is 6.2% of wages for Social Security (up to the same
maximum that applies to self-employment income) and 1.45% of
wages for Medicare (without a maximum). The 0.9% Mfordable
Care Act tax applies to the employee on his or her wages above
the noted thresholds. 35
A partner cannot be an employee of a partnership or receive
wages from a partnership for services rendered. 36 Outside of
Excluded Income, a general partner's distributive share of
income is always NESE.37 NESE does not include the distributive
share of any limited partner other than guaranteed payments
under section 707(c) for services rendered. 38 Note that a partner
can hold both a limited and general partner interest, and section
1402(a) applies to each separately. The limited partner exception
was added to prevent passive investors from obtaining Social
Security coverage. Limited partners had originally been subject
to Social Security and Medicare taxes to the same extent as
general partners, but Congress was concerned that limited
partnerships might be established as investment vehicles in
order to obtain Social Security coverage, and therefore excluded
limited partners in the late 1970s. 39 Who qualifies as a limited
partner is not defined in the Code or Regulations, but it appears
from the legislative history and the plain language of the statute
that a state law limited partner is intended. 40 Thus, apparently
all tax partners who are not state law limited partners, including
LLC members, fall under the general NESE rule. 41
To summarize, all income from a trade or business (other
than Excluded Income) of any partner (other than a limited
partner) is NESE, regardless of the partner's participation in the
business, regardless of the capital invested in the business, and
35 See I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111; I.R.S. Notice 1036 (Dec. 2013); I.R.S. Notice 2007·92,
2007-47I.R.B. 1036. Notwithstanding this division, there is evidence that employees bear
the economic burden of the entire tax. They pay their own share directly and, in effect, the
employer's share through reduced wages. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 285-86
(7th ed. 2005).
36 Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256.
37 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
38 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
39 See Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper-Reflections on the
Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, 85 (2000).
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-702, pt. 1, at 40 (1977). At that time, only a state law limited
partnership could have been intended, as LLCs and similar entities did not yet exist. See
David C. Culpepper et aI., Self-Employment Taxes and Passthrough Entities: Where Are
We Now?, 109 TAX NOTES 211, 212 (2005). The Service might be authorized to expand
that definition.
41 See Culpepper et aI., supra note 40.
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regardless of the character of the business. It is thus very
possible for a partner (other than a limited partner) to have
NESE that is unrelated to any services performed by the partner.
One might think that both wages and NESE would measure
the same thing-income earned from the provision of services.
The fact that this is not the case has much to do with the history
of the Social Security tax. The Social Security tax structure was
originally centered on the employer-employee relationship.42 In
the early years, coverage extended only to limited groups of wage
earners. 43 The self-employed were not covered. 44 Thus, originally
it was clear that the Social Security tax (the Medicare tax had
not yet been created)45 applie.d only to income from services. The
self-employed originally resisted coverage, but then in the 1950s
acquiesced partly due to the fact that meaningful coverage could
be had at what at the time was still a low rate of tax. 46 Congress
had been concerned about the administrative feasibility of
including the self-employed within the Social Security system,
particularly with regard to obtaining accurate reports of their
income. 47 These concerns were eventually laid to rest and the
self-employed were included, but nothing in the legislative
history suggests that Congress wanted the focus of the Social
Security tax to move from a tax on income from services to a tax
on income from services and capital. Further, at the time the
self-employed were brought into the fold, much of the discussion
seems to have centered on applying the Social Security tax to
professionals such as doctors and lawyers, that is, service
providers. 48 Thus, when Congress brought the self-employed
within the Social Security tax system, it likely thought that
NESE primarily focused on income from services. Further, by
excluding certain passive income and later income of limited
partners (historically, by definition, passive participants),
Congress made some effort to exclude from NESE certain kinds
of income that are not from services.
Finally, there would have been little logic to expanding the
Social Security tax to include income from capital. Why should
the type of income subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes
for employees be different than that for the self-employed?
42 See Dilley, supra note 39, at 70.
431d.
44 ld. at 71.
45 It was enacted in 1965. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
46 See Dilley, supra note 39, at 71-74.
47 S. REP. NO. 81-1669, at 11-12 (1950); see also Yoder v. Harris, 650 F.2d 1170, 1173
(lOth Cir. 1981) (discussing the relevant legislative history).
48 See Dilley, supra note 39, at 71-74.
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Employers and employees are not being rewarded for using
double-tax C corporations as S corporations, which can also have
employees and are subject to the same employment tax rules as
C corporations. S corporations have been on the scene since 1958
and conceptually since 1946. 49 Further, the Social Security
benefits one receives are a function of what one pays in. 50 Why
would Congress want the self-employed to have a larger base for
benefits than employees? There is thus little logic in applying
Social Security and Medicare taxes to income from capital.
Further, there is no good reason why passive owners who are
limited partners are not subject to self-employment taxes and
passive owners who are LLC members are subject to
self-employment taxes. In an increasing number of states, limited
partners have increasing rights to participate in the affairs of the
limited partnership in their capacity as limited partners,51
making their automatic exclusion from NESE dubious. The logic
behind these dichotomies has not been apparent to the Service
either.52
B.

Income From Capital Conundrum
In 1997, the Treasury proposed regulations in this area. This
was one of several efforts I will outline that attempt to limit
NESE to income from services, or at least reduce the amount of
income from capital that is included in NESE. The Treasury
faced a terminological challenge, in that it had to squeeze its
regulations into the statutory general/limited partner structure.
It did this by freeing the term "limited partner" in the tax statute
from that term in state law statutes. Under the Proposed
Regulations, a member of any state law entity that is classified
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes can be treated
as a limited partner for section 1402 purposes under some
circumstances. 53 The Proposed Regulations also partially address
the overarching issue of when income is from services and when
from capital.

49 See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606. See generally RICHARD
B. GOODE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE POSTWAR CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE
(1946).
50 See Dilley, supra note 39, at 70.
51 See UN IF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (2001).
52 Some older private letter rulings treat an LLC member's share of income as
NESE. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9525058 (June 23, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9452024 (Dec. 30, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9432018 (Aug. 12, 1994).
53 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997). These
were preceded by Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.1402(a)-18, which focused more
on LLCs as such. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67253, 67254 (Dec. 29,
1994).
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The laudable objective of the Proposed Regulations is to
ensure that similarly situated individuals owning interests in
entities formed under different statutes or in different
jurisdictions are treated similarly.54 The Proposed Regulations
treat an individual as a limited partner unless the individual (1)
has personal liability for the debts of or claims against the
partnership by reason of being a partner; (2) has authority to
contract on behalf of the partnership under the statute or law
pursuant to which the partnership is organized; or (3)
participates in the partnership's trade or business for more than
500 hours during the taxable year.55 Note that if a state law
limited partner meets one of the three criteria, he is not a limited
partner for section 1402 purposes.
By statute, no member of any type of LLC has general
liability for the obligations of the LLC in their capacity as
members; thus test (1) of the Proposed Regulations could not
apply to an LLC.56 If an LLC is "member-managed," commonly
all members have the apparent authority to contract on behalf of
the LLC.57 Consequently, usually no member of a
member-managed LLC qualifies as a limited partner under the
Proposed Regulations. In a "manager-managed" LLC, the
managers have the exclusive authority to manage the LLC and
typically have the authority to contract on behalf of the LLC.
Members who are not managers normally do not have any
apparent authority to contract. 58 Consequently, these
non-managing members can qualify as limited partners as long
as they do not fail the 500-hour test. In states that have
adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act ("RULLCA"), members of both types of LLCs are
not automatically agents of the LLC.59 Consequently, in
RULLCA-adopted states, the critical test will be whether or not
the member participates over 500 hours per year.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997). The
500-hour rule is derived from the regulatory definition of material participation under the
passive loss rules of section 469. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (2013).
56 A limited liability partnership ("LLP") is a general partnership with a liability
shield. Thus, its partners are general partners, who in most states have the authority to
contract to the same extent as general partners in general partnerships. Thus, they also
would not qualify as limited partners under the Proposed Regulations, irrespective of
whether they hold multiple classes of interests or not. See Culpepper et aI., supra note 40;
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEIN BERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAw ~ 1.05 n.754 (2012).
57 See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 56, ~ 7.02[2].
58 Id. ~ 7.02[3].
59 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301 (amended 2006). The following states have adopted
RULLCA: California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Utah, and Wyoming.
54
55
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The Proposed Regulations contain a special rule for services
partnerships, under the assumption that virtually everyone
involved will be actively performing services. The Proposed
Regulations provide that if substantially all of the activities of a
partnership involve the performance of services in the fields of
health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial
science, or consulting, any individual who provides such services
for the partnership cannot be classified as a limited partner,60
and thus all of his or her income is NESE (other than Excluded
Income).
The Proposed Regulations permit individuals to hold more
than one class of interest in any partnership except a services
partnership. A partner may bifurcate his interests, with some
interests earning NESE, and other "limited partnership
interests" not earning NESE.61 Thus, the treatment that is
available today in a state law limited partnership the Proposed
Regulations
make
available
to
all non-services
tax
partnerships.62 It is here that the Proposed Regulations make an
initial attempt to tussle with the issue of when income is from
services and when from capital. In effect, the Proposed
Regulations are saying that for non-services partnerships
(irrespective of the state law classification), it is permissible to
create a class of limited partnership interests to which
non-NESE income can be allocated. This income can be viewed as
coming from capital and not from services. While the Proposed
Regulations are hardly comprehensive, they take a step in the
right direction.
The Proposed Regulations were generally well received,63 but
Congress imposed a moratorium, stating that they could not be

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)·2(h)(5), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997).
Under the Proposed Regulations, it is possible to qualify as a limited partner even
if the partner participates over 500 hours and does not hold multiple classes of interest.
For this rule to apply, limited partners (as normally defined under the Proposed
Regulations) must own a substantial, continuing interest in the partnership, and the
rights and obligations of the individual in question must be identical to those for the
limited partnership class. The underlying presumption apparently is that the partner
would be paid for her services, and the rest of any payment should be seen as return on
capital. Note that the partnership would still have to have two classes of interest overall.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h)(4), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997).
62 The Proposed Regulations, however, permit the bifurcation of interests only to the
extent the individual's rights and obligations with respect to a limited partnership class of
interest is identical to the rights and obligations of other partners in that class who
(1) qualify as limited partners under the Proposed Regulations without regard to the
bifurcation rules, and (2) own a substantial interest in the partnership. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-2(h)(3) to (4), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997).
63 See John R. Marquis, Current Status of Limited Liability Companies and the
Self-Employment Income Tax, 77 MICH. B.J. 440,441 (1998).
60
61
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finalized before July 1, 1998. 64 That date has long come and gone
without the Treasury taking any additional action on the
Proposed Regulations, though they have not been withdrawn.
Congress appears to have been concerned about the risk of
existing state law limited partners being reclassified as other
than limited partners for federal income tax purposes. 65 In fact,
this risk was quite slight, as most limited partners doubtless fail
all three tests. 66 Further, in those cases where reclassification
might happen, it is likely justified. Political pressure, not for the
first time, may have taken precedence over sound tax policy, and
to date the Treasury has not had the intestinal fortitude to take
another run at it.
The difficulty with the Proposed Regulations is that they do
not tackle the income-from-capital versus income-from-services
issues head on. On the other hand, the Service was bound by the
limitations of the statute it was interpreting. The only "out" from
NESE was the income allocated to a limited partner. Others have
had a freer hand.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AI CPA") in 1998, in response to the Proposed Regulations,
suggested a statutory change. 67 In broad outline, the AICPA's
proposed amendment provides that partners in tax partnerships
have NESE to the extent of the reasonable value of the services
performed on behalf of the partnership. It contains a safe harbor
for determining the reasonable value of services. If a partner's
NESE varies from the safe harbor by more than 10%, the NESE
is subject to reasonableness testing on the basis of facts and
circumstances. The safe harbor NESE is the partner's
distributive share of partnership income or loss plus the section
707(c) guaranteed payment for services minus a reasonable rate
of return on the partner's capital account at the beginning of the
year. The rate of return on the partner's capital account is
deemed to be reasonable if the rate used is 150% of the

See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 11 Stat. 788, 882.
See Culpepper et aI., supra note 40.
Congress itself partially acknowledged the truth of this in 1997. When discussing
the passive loss rules, the Statement of Managers for the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
observes that limited partners usually do not materially participate in a partnership's
activities. H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 661-62 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); see also Culpepper et aI.,
supra note 40, at 220 n.58.
67 See Michael E. Mares, AICPA Forwards Legislative Proposal on Self-Employment
Taxes, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 39-34 (1998). H.R. 4137, 108th Congo (2004) takes a similar
approach to that of the AICPA (doubtless not by coincidence).
64
65
66
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"applicable federal rate"68 ("AFR") at the end of the partnership's
tax year.
The proposal has several shortcomings. It does not except
services partnerships, the most likely area of abuse,
notwithstanding the fact that an objective review of most service
partnerships would conclude that all or almost all of their income
is NESE. What is worse, given the safe harbor, service
partnerships have an incentive to inflate capital accounts to
avoid NESE. This could be done by making cash contributions to
the partnership and holding them in a money market account.
Further, capital accounts69 are usually not precise measures of
the value of partners' invested capital. While they can under
some circumstances be "restated" to current value,70 this is
relatively uncommon. A partner's capital account may lag far
behind or move far ahead of the value of the partner's
partnership interest. Thus, a reasonable rate of return on the
partner's capital account may yield a meaningless number.
Finally, while there is much to be said for bright, predicable
lines, the 150% AFR standard is arbitrary. For some industries,
the 150% rate could be far high or far low. 71 The AICPA provides
for additional fudge room by permitting partners to vary from the
safe harbor by 10%. Of course, what the AICPA is likely trying to
do is limit partners' NESE as much as practicable.
In 2005, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
("JCT") also proposed a statutory change. 72 In 2006, the JCT
proposed a modified version of its 2005 proposal. 73 I discuss these
in detail in my Tax Lawyer article. Here I will cut to the chase.
Under the modified proposal, all income except Excluded Income
is NESE in the case of a partnership engaged in the performance
of services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture,
68 The Service sets short-term, mid-term, and long-term applicable federal rates
monthly. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-43, 2008-31 I.R.B. 258. Curiously, the AICPA report
does not specify which of these three applicable federal rates it would use.
69 Under the Regulations, capital accounts must be increased for the fair market
value of contributed property (net of associated debt), money contributed, and allocable
partnership income. The capital accounts must be decreased for the fair market value of
distributed property, money distributed, and partnership losses. See Treas_ Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended 2013).
70 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (as amended 2013).
71 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ADDITIONAL OPTIONS
TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 34 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter JCT 2006], available at
http://www .finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairmanlreleasel?id=196654d 7 -c5d3-4S4 7 -b6edOd6a3d5c3d56.
72 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 1 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109JPRT98128/content-detail.html. I do not discuss
their S corporation proposals, as they are moot under my proposal.
73 See JCT 2006, supra note 71.
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accounting, actuarial science, or consulting ("professional
services"). The 2006 effort did not contain a proposal for
non-service partnerships.
The American Bar Association Tax Section has taken several
runs at this issue. I will focus only on the most recent effort, if for
no other reason than I participated in the task force that
prepared the Section's comments. 74
In its comments,75 which are fairly brief, the Tax Section
objects to the "wholesale expansion" of the income treated as
NESE. It is not clear to what expansion the Tax Section is
referring. The real expansion is occurring because an unchanged
section 1402 is applying to a broader range of businesses and
thus a broader range of income, and it is not coming from the
JCT. The Tax Section argues that for both service and
non-service partnerships, the most appropriate rule is to treat as
NESE only that portion of the net income of a partnership that
represents reasonable compensation for services rendered. The
Tax Section recommends that if the JCT approach for service
partnerships is adopted, an exception for "de minimis service
partners" be created for those who provide low amounts of
services. Under the Tax Section proposal, NESE for de minimis
service partners consists of guaranteed payments as well as the
partners' distributive share of income generally, but in the latter
case only to the extent it constitutes reasonable compensation for
services rendered. With regard to non-services partnerships, the
Tax Section argues "strongly" that NESE be limited to an
amount that constitutes reasonable compensation, as income also
will come from capital. Should that be considered to be
administratively unworkable, the Tax Section recommends a
complex proposal that includes guaranteed payments as NESE.
Additionally, a "material participation partner's" distributive
share of income (other than Excluded Income) is NESE to the
extent of reasonable compensation for services. The Tax Section
further recommends that there be a rebuttable presumption that
guaranteed payments and the distributive share are NESE up to
a "presumption amount"; the Tax Section suggests that the
maximum income to which the Social Security tax is applied
($117,000 in 2014) be that presumption amount. As I discuss
below, it has become common for advisors to S corporations to

74 See Paul J. Sax, ABA Tax Section Suggests Legislative Fix for LLC SelfEmployment Tax, 99 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-23 (1999)_
75 See A.BA SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO

IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITI'EE ON
TAXATION 7-9 (2006)_ I do not address the S corporation proposals, as they are mooted by
my proposal.
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recommend that shareholder employees only take the Social
Security tax maximum as a salary and let the rest of the S
corporation's income "flow through" as non-wage income.
(Elsewhere in its comments, the Tax Section endorses this
approach.) The Tax Section is attempting to obtain official
sanction for a practice that likely commonly understates
compensation. If the Social Security tax maximum is the
presumption amount, it is a safe bet that only ill-informed
partners will have compensation income in excess of that
amount, and large amounts of what should be compensation
income will escape Medicare (and for the more aggressive, Social
Security) taxes. Congress and the Service should not entertain
such an invitation to end-run the Social Security and Medicare
tax system, particularly given the financial difficulties in which
Social Security and Medicare find themselves. 76
I propose amending section 1402 to catch it up with the real
world. I discuss my proposal in terms of partnerships, but would
apply it to disregarded entities/sole proprietors as well. What the
JeT and the Proposed Regulations do wisely, and will go a long
way toward limiting abuse, is to carve out a special rule for
partnerships primarily engaged in the performance of services. I
agree with the JeT that all income of a services partnership
(except Excluded Income) should be classified as NESE. While it
is certainly possible that a given service partnership has a
substantial investment in capital, allowing service partnerships
to allocate earnings to capital opens the door wide for abuse. As I
noted above, for the vast majority of service partnerships, capital
is most likely not a large income-producing factor. Additionally,
there may occasionally be partners in service partnerships who
provide little in the way of services, but they likely once did if the
partnership is allocating income to them. Further, the income
that is being allocated to them is, most likely, from someone's
performance of services. By the mere expedient of shifting income
from active to inactive partners, Social Security and Medicare
taxes should not be avoided. Treating all income (other than
Excluded Income) from service partnerships as NESE will create
little unfairness, while avoiding many shenanigans and reducing
the enforcement burdens of the Service. The Proposed
Regulations and the JeT, however, limit the rule for service
partnerships to those engaged in the performance of professional
services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial science, or consulting. Yet the underlying

76 See Social Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 109th Congo 1-17 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Finance Hearing].
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policy issues apply to any service partnership, so I would apply
my proposal to any service partnership, not just those engaged in
the specified professions. My broader approach creates the need
to formally define a services partnership. A reasonable definition
is any partnership less than 20% of the gross income of which is
attributable to non-human capital.
For non-service partnerships, I largely agree with the Tax
Section. Anyone performing services for a non-services
partnership should be required to be paid reasonable
compensation for those services, and that amount should be
NESE. I have no "presumption amount" which, as I noted above,
will commonly lead to improper tax avoidance. I treat
partnership income in excess of reasonable compensation as
income from capital and not as NESE.
The reasonable compensation for services standard may
seem unduly vague, and indeed will create administrative
burdens, but in fact it has been one we have lived with for
generations. It had been regularly applied in the C corporation
context. Commonly there, shareholder employees had attempted
to avoid the C corporation double tax by paying themselves a
large salary. They argued that as salary, the payment is income
to the recipient, deductible to the corporate payor, and thus (they
hoped) subject to one level of tax. 77 Courts have analyzed these
purported salary payments under various standards, and if they
concluded the salary was unreasonably high, reduced it, with the
excess being reclassified as a nondeductible dividend. 78 There
have also been occasions where the courts have looked at
whether a salary is too low, as I will discuss below.
Admittedly, allowing courts to resolve compensation issues
creates inefficiencies and uncertainties. In a given set of
circumstances, taxpayers will not be able to be completely certain
if their allocation between compensation and a return on capital
will be respected, and it might encourage some to play the audit
lottery in the hopes that their abusive scheme will not be
uncovered. But the reality is that a fixed rule often will be far off
the mark. What is appropriate compensation varies greatly based
on the amount of capital involved, the extent of the services
provided, the nature of the industry involved, and doubtless a
See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012).
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Comm'r, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying
a multiple-factor test); Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999)
(analyzing the reasonableness of the salary based on whether an adequate return was
being paid to the shareholders on their investment); see also Haffner's Servo Stations, Inc.
V. Comm'r, 326 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying factors but acknowledging the
legitimacy of the Exacto Spring decision).
77
78
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host of other factors. The inequity of a fixed rule in the
non-services partnership context argues for a more general
standard. Further, the fact that all income (other than Excluded
Income) of service partnerships is automatically NESE will ease
the administrative burden on the Service and the courts,
providing something of an offset.
C.

The Scofflaw Gambit
The current defmition of NESE means that a taxpayer who
wants to avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes will not find
the partnership soil very fertile. S corporations are a very
different matter. While a partner may not be an employee of a
partnership,79 there is nothing to keep a shareholder from being
an employee of a corporation, whether it be a C corporation or an
S corporation. Employers and employees are only assessed Social
Security and Medicare taxes on the compensation that is paid to
the employee. 3o That fact gives rise to the following tax avoidance
technique using S corporations. The S corporation pays a modest
salary or perhaps no salary at all to its shareholder employees.
The net income of the S corporation not used to pay salaries
"flows through" under the regular S corporation section 1366
rules, arguably as non-compensation, and therefore arguably not
subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. For example, in
2014 a neurosurgeon with $1 million of net S corporation income
(before salaries) from her services might pay herself the Social
Security income maximum of $117,000 as a salary, and let the
rest of the income flow through as non-compensation. She thus
saves the Medicare tax of 2.9% x $883,000 = $25,607. 31 Some

Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CoB. 256.
See I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111.
Easily the most famous person to use this technique was former Senator, vice
presidential nominee, presidential candidate, and bon vivant John Ed wards. Over four
years (from 1995 to 1998), on income of about $27 million, he saved Medicare taxes of over
$590,000. See Michael Moss & Kate Zernike, Campaign Releases Edwards's Earnings,
NY TIMES, July 10, 2004, http://www_nytimes.com/2004/07/1O/us/2004-cam paign-northcarolina-senator-campaign-releases-edwards-s-earnings.html. The journalism on this
news story left something to be desired_ The technique was portrayed as a legitimate "tax
shelter." If challenged, a court most likely would have held almost all of the S corporation
income to be compensation. The specifics: Edwards apparently incorporated midway
through 1995_ In that year he paid himself a salary of $180,000 on income for the year
(including pre-incorporation) of $5 million_ In 1996, the S corporation earnings were $4
million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1997, the S corporation earnings
were $11 million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1998, his final year oflaw
practice, the S corporation earnings were $5.5 million with the same $360,000 salary. See
Tom Daley, Letter to the Editor, Edwards's S Corp: Can We Get the Numbers Right?, 104
TAX NOTES 1310 (2004). The total earnings reported in the Daley piece are somewhat less
than in the New York Times article ($25.5 million versus $27 million). I have not found a
source for this, but I have heard that the $360,000 salary was based on what the average
personal injury lawyer makes in North Carolina, the state where Edwards practiced law.
79
80
81
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advisors are routinely telling their clients to pay the Social
Security maximum to themselves as salary, and to treat the
balance of the S corporation income as non-compensation. 82
This gambit has been going on for many years. Senator
Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, calls those who make such
inappropriate use of S corporations "Social Security scofflaws."83
While it would be more fun to call the neurosurgeon example the
"Scofflaw gambit," going forward I will call it the "NESE gambit."
The loss to the fisc from this technique is not insubstantial. The
underpayment of Medicare and Social Security taxes through the
use of S corporations is estimated to be about $6 billion per year
for each tax, or about $12 billion per year in total. 84
Taxpayers have used S corporations to avoid both Social
Security taxes and Medicare taxes. Since Social Security taxes
are only applied to limited amounts of compensation, S
corporation shareholders have to pay themselves relatively low
salaries or no salaries to save these taxes. And, in fact, they have
done so. The Service has challenged the most piggish gambit
users, those that have paid themselves little or no salary. The
Service has won all of these cases. Courts have generally
concluded that earnings of the S corporation constituted
compensation to the shareholder-employees, either under a
substance-over-form analysis or by concluding that the
distributed earnings constituted reasonable compensation for the
services rendered. 85 Curiously, the Service has never issued a
See Kip Dellinger, Edwards's S Corp: The Revised Numbers Are Still Ridiculous, 104 TAX
NOTES 1456 (2004).
82 I have not come across written evidence of this, but it is often implied. See, e.g.,
Alan L. Olsen, Ten Tax Planning Ideas for Small Businesses in 2009, GROCO,
http://www.groco.com/readingroom/tax_smallbusiness.aspx (last visited June 2, 2014).
83 See Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 76, at 29-30.
84 In 2005, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated that
for 2006-2010, unless the law is changed, the Medicare and Social Security tax gap
resulting from under-compensation of Subchapter S shareholder·employees would be
$30.2 billion and $30.8 billion, respectively. Id. at 41 (statement of Han. Russell George,
Inspector General for Tax Administration, United States Department of the Treasury).
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in 2009 outlining
S corporation compliance issues. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1O-195,
TAX GAP: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION TAX
RULES 25 (2009). It estimated $3 billion in employment tax revenue losses over tax years
2003 and 2004-still substantial, but significantly less than the 2005 study. The studies
apply to different time frames, which might explain much of the difference. The very
substantial gap is still a little perplexing. Given the jump in the use of S corporations, I
lean to the former over the latter.
85 See Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 141 (2001), affd, 90
F. App'x 669 (3d Cir. 2004); Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004);
Specialty Transp. & Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 91 F. App'x 787 (2004); Spicer
Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); W. Mgmt., Inc. v. United
States, 45 Fed. Cl. 543 (2000); Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis.
1989), aff'd per curiam, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. Comm'r, 853
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ruling involving the NESE gambit. 86 It has only issued a ruling
where the taxpayer failed to take any salary.87 Many
practitioners are reluctant to advise clients to violate a revenue
ruling, and the Service might have saved the fisc billions of
dollars had it issued a ruling on the NESE gambit.
In a pure services S corporation, through which, for example,
a doctor or a lawyer practices her profession, the NESE gambit is
obviously abusive. In the closely-held corporation context, courts
generally have required corporations to pay reasonable
compensation to their shareholder-employees. 88 In the
neurosurgeon example above, all of the income of the S
corporation is attributable to her services. Therefore, normally
reasonable compensation is all of the net income of the S
corporation. Reasonable compensation must be based on the
value of the neurosurgeon herself and not, say, the value of the
average neurosurgeon. Otherwise the top neurosurgeon in a state
making five times the average could argue that her compensation
should be based on what the average neurosurgeon earns, or
one-fifth of what she is actually earning. That would be an easy
way to save Medicare and possibly Social Security taxes. But if
that top neurosurgeon went to work for a bona fide employer, she
would not accept the average wage-she would insist on being
compensated for her actual worth. That is her reasonable
compensation.
While there is no hard data, it is highly likely that for most
service S corporations, all of the net income of the S corporation
represents income from services. As noted earlier, there might be
an argument in the occasional service S corporation that there is
a sufficient capital investment so that a small percentage of the
income is allocable to capital. But clearly what is usually going
on is an effort to end-run the Medicare tax and in some cases
even the Social Security tax systems. It is axiomatic that

F. Supp. 365 (D. Idaho 1994); Joly v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 633 (1998), affd, 211 F.3d
1269 (6th Cir. 2000). In these cases, the courts often focused on distributed earnings, and
typically most or all of the earnings were distributed. Distribution should not change the
analysis. If the S corporation earnings are indeed best classified as wages to the
shareholder employees, whether or not they are distributed in a given year should not
change the answer. Typically, the shareholder employees have full control over timing.
See Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc. V. Comm'r, 121 T.C. 89 (2003), affd, 425 F.3d 1203
(9th Cir. 2005).
86 See H.R. 3970, 110th Congo § 1211 (2007) (Congressman Rangel attacking the
totality of the problem within the S corporation context).
87 Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287. Thanks to Robert Rombro, Esq. of Baltimore,
Maryland for bringing this revenue ruling to my attention.
88 See Exacto Spring Corp. V. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999); Joly, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 633.
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substance controls form,89 and for that to occur, in most cases all
of the net income of a service S corporation should be subject to
Social Security and Medicare taxes. 90
It was a long wait, but in 2010 there was finally an NESE
gambit case. The taxpayer took a small, but not a de minimis
salary from his S corporation. While the court did not accept the
salary the taxpayer took, sadly it did not require all of the income
of the S corporation to be treated as employment income. Indeed,
the arguments I made above notwithstanding, the court accepted
the argument that only what the average, similarly situated
professional made was a measure of the appropriate salary,
arguably opening the door wider for taxpayers who wish to avoid
employment taxes on their services income. In Watson v. United
States,91 the taxpayer, Watson, formed an S corporation of which
he was the sole shareholder. The S corporation was a partner in
an accounting firm partnership. The other partners were also
one-person S corporations. In 2002, Watson's S corporation
received profit distributions of $203,651 from the partnership. In
2003, it received $175,470 in profit distributions. In each of those
years, the S corporation paid Watson a salary of $24,000 per
year, let the balance of the income "flow through" as
non-compensation income, and paid that balance to Watson as a
"dividend." The trial court and the Eighth Circuit in its
affirmation concluded that Watson's salary and dividend
payments were an effort to avoid federal employment taxes, and
that the dividends paid to Watson were, in part, remuneration
for services performed. The court did not conclude, as it should
have, that all of the dividends paid were income for services and
subject to federal employment taxes. An expert witness testified
that fair market value of Watson's services for the years in
question was about $91,044 per year. Only the difference
between that amount and $24,000 was held to be subject to
federal employment taxes, interest, and penalties. The fact that a
similarly situated taxpayer in a partnership or working as an
employee for a large accounting firm would have had to pay
employment taxes on all of the net income earned from services
seems to have escaped the trial court's attention, though not that
of the Eighth Circuit, as I will discuss.

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978).
A similar technique was tried unsuccessfully with a limited partnership. See
Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137 (2011), which
admittedly involved a quite abusive fact pattern.
9! Watson, P.C. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), aiI'd, 668
F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012). The Eighth Circuit cited my Tax Lawyer article, supra note 1,
in the text of its opinion, but alas did not follow its reasoning.
89
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Watson in the short run flings the door wide open for the
NESE gambit. Provided taxpayers earn more than the "average,"
they can often expect to avoid employment taxes on significant
portions of their services income. If Watson were the law of the
land, query whether it would be worth it to the Service to litigate
a case where salaries equal to the Social Security tax maximum
were paid, since it often will be likely that the fair market value
of the services performed will be relatively close to that amount.
Again, under the court's reasoning in Watson, at issue is not the
fair market value of the taxpayer's own services, but those of an
average, similarly situated taxpayer, whose services might be
worth less than those of the taxpayer in question.
Hopefully the Tax Court92 and other circuits will not follow
the reasoning in Watson. Actually, there was a bit of a waffle in
the Eighth Circuit's affirming opinion. Mter citing my Tax
Lawyer article, it stated: "Nevertheless, although we think
evidence of shareholder-employee billings and collections may be
probative on the issue of compensation, in view of all the
evidence presented to the district court in this case, we see no
error."93 An optimistic reading of this language would be that the
Eighth Circuit was affirming a finding of fact rather than one of
law. Certainly, the Eighth Circuit left a door open to reach a
different decision under similar facts, and taxpayers in the
Eighth Circuit cannot be completely sanguine about their
prospects.
The Renkemeyer94 case also provides some hope that reason
will ultimately prevail. Renkemeyer involved a similar, but more
abusive effort than that in Watson with a law firm limited
liability partnership.95 There the Tax Court generally took the
position that income from services is subject to self-employment
taxes and cannot be avoided by structural fancy footwork. "The
92 The Tax Court followed the reasoning of Watson in McAlary Ltd. v. Commissioner,
No. 21068·118, 2013 WL 4052429 (T.C. Aug. 12,2013) (summary opinion), an 8 case, that
is, a small tax case that cannot be cited as precedent. Likely the Tax Court did not realize
the significance of the case when it accepted the taxpayer's request to designate it an 8
case. Thanks to Professors Jensen, Lederman, McMahon, and Todd who brought me up to
speed on 8 cases.
93 Watson, 668 F.3d at 1019.
94 Renkemeyer, 136 T.C. 137.
95 Renkemeyer involved a law firm of tax lawyers organized as an LLP (not a limited
partnership). To oversimplify the facts a bit, in 2004 the partners recapitalized the LLP
into "general managing partner partnership units" and "investing partnership units,"
with the general managing partner partnership units having full authority to act on
behalf of the partnership. The vast majority of the income was allocated to the investing
partnership units. The partners tried to claim that these should be treated as limited
partnership interests and be free from self·employment taxes. The court rejected this
approach and held that all of the partnership income was subject to self-employment
taxes. [d.
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legislative history of section 1402(a)(13) does not support a
holding that Congress contemplated excluding partners who
performed services ... in their capacity as partners (i.e., acting in
the manner of self-employed persons), from liability for
self-employment taxes."96 It is hard to see why the Tax Court
would not reach a comparable conclusion for the NESE gambit
with S corporations.
As long as S corporations can be used to avoid employment
taxes, I believe the political hurdles to repealing Subchapter S
will be too great. But if this benefit is taken away, the political
prospects improve substantially, though one must never forget
that the S corporation bar is politically powerful. While there is
no data to prove this, I and others believe that the NESE gambit
drives the use of S corporations. It is difficult to otherwise
explain the substantial popularity of S corporations. My Tax
Lawyer article goes into this issue in depth. Also, eliminating this
benefit for S corporations in and of itself might strike a major
blow for pass-through entity reform. It would make S
corporations less popular and its erstwhile proponents less
averse to reform. Indeed, without the NESE gambit, S
corporations might wither on the vine.
III. REPEAL SUBCHAPrER K INSTEAD?

Much ink has been spilled on the problems with Subchapter
K.97 It is surely true that abuses can happen. Subchapter K and
its regulations are an extraordinarily complex area of tax law. Of
just one piece of this puzzle, the special allocation rules of section
704(b), Professor Lawrence Lokken famously wrote: "[They are] a
creation of prodigious complexity ... essentially impenetrable to
all but those with the time, talent, and determination to become

96 Id. at 150. Section 1402(a)(13) excludes income allocated to a limited partnership
interest from self-employment taxes. Thus, even if the taxpayers had formed an actual
limited partnership and allocated income to the limited partnership interests, the Tax
Court's language indicates that the limited partner status would not have been respected
and self-employment taxes would not have been avoided.
97 A partial list: Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a
Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249 (1999); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing
the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229 (1993); Mark
P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K' Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1 (1990); Curtis
J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105; Noel B. Cunningham,
Commentary, Needed Reform: Tending the Sick Rose, 47 TAX L. REV. 77 (1991); William
D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership
Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 3 (1991); Philip F. Postlewaite et a!., A Critique of the ALI's
Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K- Proposals on the Taxation of Partners, 75
GEO. L.J. 423 (1986); William S. McKee, Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity
Approach, 66 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1980); see also Darryll K Jones, Towards Equity and
Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047 (2006); Karen C. Burke,
Partnership Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 677 (1998).
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thoroughly prepared experts on the subject."98 Professors George
Yin and David Shakow, as Reporters for the American Law
Institute, produced an impressive study that was critical of
Subchapter K. In it they proposed "an optional tax system" for
the simple private business firm grounded in Subchapter K, but
"with a strong resemblance to Subchapter S."99 Professors Yin
and Shakow did not launch a full frontal assault on Subchapter
K, perhaps cognizant of the political perils of such an effort. In
addition to the private business firm proposal, they proposed to
keep Subchapter K, though with substantial changes. 1oo
I actually think that Subchapter K has much to commend it.
The flexibility it offers promotes economic efficiency. Yes, abuses
can happen, but I have yet to see any data suggesting that they
are a large part of the partnership pie. Professors Yin and
Shakow have argued that the complexity of Subchapter K argues
for the creation of an alternative, simpler entity.lol But the
complexity of Subchapter K is to a large extent voluntary. It is
perfectly possible to have a simple tax partnership, and there are
many. Further, S corporations, with their rigid qualification
rules, particularly the one class of stock requirement and the
lack of a section 752 analog, are simply unsuitable for many
complex business undertakings where income is often allocated
in tranches to different owners. But in some ways, this debate is
a waste of time. The reality is that repealing or dramatically
changing Subchapter K is a political nonstarter. Perhaps the best
evidence of that fact is that Professors Yin and Shakow were not
able to
persuade
the American Law
Institute,
a
reform-oriented-and in the view of some, moderately
progressive-organization, to adopt their views, notwithstanding
that they did not even go so far as to recommend repeal of
Subchapter K. Repeal of Subchapter K has never been given
serious consideration by Congress. Further, some kind of
partnership taxation will always have to be with us if for no
other reason than taxpayers can inadvertently find themselves in

98 Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 545, 621 (1986).
99 See ALI REPORT, supra note 3, at 125. This would have been an elective system.

For example, it would have in some cases severely restricted special allocations and would
have required gain recognition (as well as loss recognition in the case of a liquidation) on
the distribution of assets. See id. at 183 (proposaI4·2(1)(a»; id. at 215 (proposaI4·5(1)(a»;
id. at 300 (proposal 5·1(1)(a»; id. at 129 (Table 1); see also Jeffery A. Maine, Linking

Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study on the
Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 223 (2000).
100 See ALI REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 5, at 273.
101 Professor Yin has not changed his mind. See George K. Yin, Comments on the
Taxation of Pass through Entities, 140 TAX NOTES 358 (2013).
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a state law partnership.102 They cannot inadvertently end up in
an S corporation. So, if we cannot repeal Subchapter K, surely we
should repeal Subchapter S. As noted above, the legitimate
benefits of Subchapter S are relatively few in number and can
either be incorporated into Subchapter K or be achieved by some
adjustments to Subchapter C. Having two pass-through regimes
is inefficient. Similarly situated taxpayers are taxed differently,
to the advantage of those with skilled advisors, and often to the
disadvantage of those with unskilled advisors. This violates
principals of vertical equity. Well-advised taxpayers can
effectively choose, albeit within limits, how much tax to pay.
Taxpayers will exploit the differences between their regimes for
their benefit. A classic example is using S corporations for the
NESE gambit.1 03 Further, the Service is required to train
personnel in two different pass-through regimes.
That said, Subchapter K is a far from perfect taxing regimen.
The ALI Report and others have pointed out its deficiencies and
made many intelligent recommendations for improvement.
Reform of Subchapter K should continue. But the fact that
Subchapter K is in need of reform is not a reason to continue a
parallel pass-through regime in Subchapter S. One of the two
. systems needs to go. It won't be Subchapter K; therefore it should
be Subchapter S. Indeed, the existence of Subchapter S impedes
the reform of Subchapter K Having two systems in play can
prevent policy makers and the Service from becoming fully
focused on one. It spreads limited human resources thin. Likely,
the pace of reform of Subchapter K will pick up once Subchapter
S is off the playing field.

IV. LET NONPUBLIC CORPORATIONS COME TO THE PARTY
It seems fair to permit nonpublic 104 state law corporations to
elect Subchapter K (or become disregarded entities if they have a
single shareholder). As I discuss below, the cost of permitting
nonpublic C corporations to do so may now not be large. I would
exclude corporations that are currently ineligible for Subchapter
S from making this election.1 05

102 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIPS § 2.01(a) (Supp. 2014).
103 See ALI REPORT, supra note 3, at 45.
104 As did H.R. 4137, so too do I define a nonpublic C corporation as a domestic
corporation, no stock of which is readily tradable. See H.R. 4137, 108th Congo (2004).
105 As did H.R. 4137. Generally, a pass·through regime is highly awkward for these

types of entities. See section 1361(b)(2), which lists corporations that are ineligible to elect
to be taxed under Subchapter S. Included are financial institutions which use the reserve
method of accounting for bad debts described in section 585 (e.g., many banks), insurance
companies subject to tax under Subchapter L, corporations to which an election under
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C corporations can have highly complex stock and debt
structures. In many cases, those structures may make the switch
to Subchapter K impractical. But usually, Subchapter K will be
up to the challenge. Many partnerships have highly complex
ownership and debt structures, but thrive in Subchapter K.I06
State and federal governments are regularly changing the
ground under business owners' feet. An owner who twenty years
ago rationally chose a C corporation, might not have done so if he
had known of the impending LLC revolution. The tax benefits
that he may have gleaned by using a C corporation are, given the
overall double tax burden, unlikely to have been so great as to
justify locking him into a now outdated choice. Further, why
should different non public business entities be taxed differently?
Closely held businesses should at least have the option of playing
on the same field, making for greater horizontal equity. Other
countries have taken a uniform approach. I07 I recommend that
the United States also take a more uniform approach, though I
would not make the election of Subchapter K mandatory for C
corporations. As I discussed above, it would be very difficult for
nonpublic entities to get by wholly without Subchapter C. As I
discuss briefly below, and in more detail in my Tax Lawyer
article, I recommend that C corporations be allowed to switch to
Subchapter K on a taxpayer-friendly basis.l o8
V. THE NUTS AND BOLTS IN BRIEF
In my Tax Lawyer article, I discuss in detail how to get from
here to there. I will briefly summarize my discussion.

A.

S Corporations
A first step toward repeal is to prohibit any further S
elections, as of the effective date of any relevant act. 109 Existing S
corporations are given the option of electing Subchapter K or C

section 936 applies (relating to Puerto Rico and possession tax credit), and domestic
international sales corporations. See JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS ~ 3.05 (4th ed. 2001).
106 See, e.g., Karen T. Lohnes, John Schmalz & Craig Gerson, Value Equals Basis and
Partners'Distributive Share: Stuffing, Fill-Ups, and Waterfalls, 105 J. TAX'N 109 (2006).
107 Germany,
for example. See Michael J. Munkert, Fallstricke der neuen
Thesaurierungsbegiinstigung, 10-07 STEUERCONSULTANT 34 (2007).
108 One might think that permitting C corporations to continue to elect Subchapter S
during the ten-year death watch might be a way of facilitating the transition to
Subchapter K, but in fact that often, perhaps usually, will not be the case. The S
corporation one-class-of-stock rule of section 1361(b)(I)(D) will make Subchapter S
unavailable to many existing C corporations. Also, section 1374 will take away much of
any tax benefit that Subchapter S provides.
109 See Small Business Tax Modernization Act, H.R. 4137, 108th Congo (2004); S Corp
Burial, supra note 8, at 643.
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for ten years. If they do neither, they automatically fall under
Subchapter K at the end of the ten years.
Generally, an S corporation that shifts to Subchapter K is
deemed to liquidate for tax purposes and reform as a tax
partnership. This process is necessary (1) to establish capital
accounts for the partners correctly;l1O (2) for section 704(c),
section 707(a)(2)(B), and section 737 to apply properly; and (3) to
establish the owner's bases in the assets properly if the S
corporation becomes a disregarded entity. The regular S
corporation rules apply until the liquidation, deemed or actual,
takes place, with one modification. I apply my recommended
reform of Social Security and Medicare taxes to S corporations
during the transition period. Thus, all income of an S corporation
primarily engaged in the performance of services is subject to
Social Security and Medicare taxes. For capital-intensive S
corporations, on the other hand, reasonable compensation for
services rendered must be paid, but only that compensation is
subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 11l
Generally I recommend that Subchapter K apply to the
liquidation of the S corporation as well as, of course, the
formation of the tax partnership. Under the current rules of
Subchapter S, the liquidating S corporation must generally
recognize any gain or loss inherent in its assets.l 12 It seems
inappropriate, however, to apply the current S corporation rules
and require gain (or permit loss) recognition on the termination
of S corporation status.l 13 The taxpayers are being forced to use
another entity, making gain recognition unfair. Typically, no real
disposition is being made. Most owners will continue the same
business.l 14 This makes loss recognition inappropriate. I
therefore recommend that S corporations and their shareholders
be allowed to move to partnerships or disregarded entities using
Subchapter K
Sufficiently creative taxpayers can find ways of
inappropriately taking advantage of these generous rules for

See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iv), (b)(2)(ii) (as amended 2013).
Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish this is to bring S corporations under the
self-employment rules, as opposed to continuing their current coverage under sections
3101, 3111, and related provisions. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH
CONG., TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING TO SMALL BUSINESS AND
CHOICE OF ENTITY 68 (Comm. Print 2008); H.R. 3970, 110th Congo § 1211 (2007).
112 I.R.C. § 336(a) (2012).
113 See I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 336(a).
114 They may want to actually liquidate the S corporation and form, for example, an
LLC. See S Corp Burial, supra note 8, at 616. Or they may want to continue using the
state law corporation, which either is disregarded for tax purposes if it has a single owner,
or is taxed under Subchapter K ifit has multiple owners. Id. at 611; I.R.C. § 701.
110

111
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liquidation of S corporations. To stop or at least impede this, I
recommend Congress authorize the Service to adopt an
anti-abuse rule that applies to this process. 115
Note that under my proposal, S corporations do not have the
option of liquidating under the current S corporation rules. This
is to prevent taxpayers from cherry-picking tax treatment, that
is, using Subchapter S for S corporations with net losses in their
assets and Subchapter K for S corporations with net gains. It is
appropriate, however, to have a brief transition period of perhaps
one year where S corporations are allowed to actually liquidate
under either Subchapter K or S. Taxpayers planning to liquidate
in fact should not be caught unawares by the statutory change.
While cherry-picking can happen during the one year, the
associated revenue losses are not likely to be great given the
limited time frame. Further, S corporation losses and deductions,
including depreciation deductions, generally flow through to the
shareholders.116 In other words, the losses have often already
been recognized by the shareholders. As a consequence, it is not
likely that there are a large number of S corporations with large
amounts of losses inherent in their assets, though there will be
some with economic losses that have not yet been taken into
account for tax purposes,117
While it is difficult to predict with certainty in the absence of
hard data, it seems doubtful that permitting largely tax-free
liquidations of S corporations will generate unacceptable revenue
losses for the fisc. Under the current rules, S corporations can
avoid distributing assets that contain significant amounts of
appreciation. Instead, they commonly retain the property in
corporate solution, depriving the government of a recognition
event. In addition, Social Security and Medicare tax revenues
will no longer be lost, creating a substantial offset, indeed likely
a net revenue increase.
What if the S corporation has earnings and profits or
unrecognized section 1374 gains? The equities in this regard are
not as strong as the equities in favor of allowing non-recognition
of the (non-section 1374) gains and losses inherent in the S
115 One example: A and B own all of the stock of an S corporation. A individually
owns asset X and B individually owns asset Y. They wish to exchange these assets with
each other. The assets do not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment under section 103l.
To avoid gain recognition, they could each contribute the assets to the S corporation. The
contribution would be tax free under section 351(a). As part of a subsequent liquidation of
the S corporation under Subchapter K, the S corporation could distribute asset Y to A and
asset X to B, potentially tax free. See I.R.C. § 731.
116 I.R.C. § 1366.
117 A drop in the value ofland, for example, would normally only be recognized in the
case of taxable disposition, as land is not depreciable. See I.R.C. § 1001.
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corporation assets. The earnings and profits and section 1374
gains originated with a C corporation, and avoiding any tax
consequence also avoids what would have been part of the
Subchapter C double tax system, and Subchapter C is not being
recommended for repeal. Here I depart from my Tax Lawyer
article and follow the lead of the Camp proposals discussed
below. The accumulated adjustments accountllB with the relevant
section 1368 potential dividend treatment and the section 1374
treatment carry over from the erstwhile S corporation to the new
entity, be it a tax partnership or a disregarded entity, with credit
given for that portion of the ten-year section 1374 time period
that elapsed while an S corporation. Further, during the
transition period, current rules apply to the section 1374 gains.
Should the proposed act contain continuity of business
enterprise and ownership interest tests? Should the business of
the erstwhile S corporation be required to be continued for some
period of time? Should the erstwhile shareholders be required to
stay on as partners for some period of time?1l9 Should a special
rule be applied to S corporations that actually liquidate and
discontinue the business? While the failure to address these
issues may mean that some owners will be able to convert
corporate assets to personal use without an income tax effect,120
on the whole, the better answer to the question is not to apply
continuity of interest standards or special rules for actual
liquidations and discontinuance of the business. Because S
corporations are being forced out of existence, the equities favor
an owner-friendly set of rules. Also, aside from the possibility of
converting business assets to personal use, which will likely be
uncommon, the relevant tax consequences after the conversion
are similar to, or even worse than, those before the conversion.
Some examples: a sale of stock in the S corporation usually
generates a capital gain or loss; the sale of a partnership interest
may generate ordinary income (i.e., worse off in a partnership);121
the gain or loss on the sale of business assets generally flows
through to the shareholders for S corporations and to partners
for partnerships (i.e., treatment unchanged). Also, determining
whether the continuity tests are met will create additional

118 I.R.C. § 1368(e).
119 These rules apply to corporate reorganizations.

See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra
note 19, ~~ 12.21, 12.61[2].
120 This could not happen with an S corporation, since the distribution of property by
an S corporation to its shareholders causes gain and possibly loss to be recognized under
sections 311(b) and 336. On the other hand, a distribution of property by a partnership to
a partner is generally not recognized to either party. See I.R.C. § 731. But see 1.R.C. §§
707(a)(2)(B), 704(c)(1)(B), 737, 751(b).
121 See I.R.C. § 751(a).
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complexity that does not seem worth the statutory effort.
Numerous questions will arise. How long should the business be
operated? What if the assets are used in a different business?
How much of an ownership change is permitted? Many of these
issues have been addressed in the corporate context. But in the
case of S corporations being forced out of existence, the courts
might address these issues differently.122 Further, if continuity
provisions are enacted, most owners likely will continue the
business long enough to pass muster, so little revenue will be
raised.

B.

C Corporations
For newly formed C corporations electing to be taxed under
Subchapter K, rules will need to be developed that track the
section 704(b) allocation rules with the multiple classes of stock
possible in a C corporation. Other special issues may arise, but
they should be manageable. A separate question arises for
existing nonpublic C corporations wishing to elect Subchapter K
(or disregarded entity status). How should they get from here to
there? Assuming it does not create undue fiscal burdens, I
recommend taking the same approach as for S corporations
(including section 1368 accumulated adjustment accounts and
section 1374). As Subchapter C would be continuing, I do not
make this approach mandatory as I do for S corporations. It
would be almost impossible to keep track of C corporations
liquidating for independent reasons and those liquidating to
continue under Subchapter K Thus, C corporations have the
option of liquidating under the current rules, which they will
prefer if overall it generates losses.1 23 An anti -abuse rule should
be created so that C corporations cannot switch to the new rules
and then promptly formally liquidate to avoid double taxation.
They might be required to continue the business for two years,
for example. For the reasons noted above for S corporations,
however, I would not apply other continuity of interest rules.
Some will view my proposal as an unduly liberal
give-away. And indeed, as I discuss below, its cost may be too
high. But there are also economic inefficiencies that are created
when some taxpayers are forced to operate within an outdated
form and others are not. New businesses forming LLCs have a
competitive advantage over older businesses trapped in C
corporations. Electing S corporation status may not be available

122 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 19, ~~ 12.21, 12.61[2].
123 It is not out of the question they will prefer it in a gain situation, as it means a

basis step up. See I.R.C. § 732.
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if their ownership structure does not permit a single class of
stock. Leveling the playing field should make for a more efficient
economy.
If the costs to the fisc of my proposal for existing C
corporations are too high, a simple solution, and probably as
reasonable as any, is simply to leave the current rules for
liquidating C corporations in effect with one adjustment: existing
nonpublic C corporations may, during the ten-year window, elect
Subchapter K or disregarded entity status, but if they do so they
are deemed to liquidate under Subchapter C, recognizing the
gains and possibly the losses per its rules. 124 To limit the tax
pain, any taxes owed are payable over five years. Again, an
anti-abuse rule should apply to prevent C corporations from
electing Subchapter K and then liquidating soon thereafter to
take advantage of the five-year payout.
Whichever of these rules are used for existing C
corporations, they should only apply during the ten-year window.
To allow these tax benefits for C corporations that liquidate after
the ten-year window is to permit them to have their cake and eat
it too, using Subchapter C when it is beneficial and switching to
Subchapter K when it is not, indefinitely.
Assuming a favorable environment in which qualifying C
corporations can elect Subchapter K at a low tax cost, will the
LLC revolution be reversed or at least slowed? Rather than
forming LLCs, will taxpayers form corporations and elect
Subchapter K? While this is not necessarily a bad thing, it is not
a likelihood for non-tax reasons. State LLC statutes have more
modern, flexible statutory architectures in comparison to typical
corporate statutes.l 25 Indeed, many who prefer for whatever
reason to operate as C corporations for tax purposes often form
LLCs and then check the box to be taxed as C corporations to
take advantage of the greater state law flexibility LLCs offer. 126
VI. CAMP PROPOSALS AND TRA 2014
In March of 2013, the Chairman of the United States House
of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, David Camp,
published options for pass-through entity tax reform.l 27 "Option
124 Of course, a C corporation can always actually liquidate and form a partnership
with all the attendant tax consequences. See LR.C. §§ 346, 332.
125 See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 56, ~ 1.02.
126 LLCs can also elect to be taxed as S corporations. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
FORM 8832 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflf8832.pdf.
127 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT ON TAX
REFORM ACT OF 2013 (2013), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploaded
files/finaLsm_bus_passthrough_legislative_texC03.12.13.pdf; HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
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I" keeps Subchapters K and S, but makes recommendations for
reform. In general, these are more taxpayer friendly for S than
for K "Option 2" repeals Subchapters K and S and replaces them
with a new Subchapter K which departs from the current version
at times in dramatic fashion. Option 2 would automatically apply
to tax partnerships. Option 2 would allow corporations to elect
the new Subchapter K, provided they are not publicly traded.
Insurance companies, DISCs, and most banks could not make
that election. I briefly discuss Option 1 and Option 2 below.
But things get still more dramatic. In February 2014, the
House Ways and Means Committee proposed the Tax Reform Act
of 2014 128 ("TRA 2014"). This massive proposal contains some
provisions of significant relevance to this Article, and is also
discussed briefly below.
A.

Option 1
Option 1 contains a diverse series of changes. There does not
seem to be any main theme, but rather a desire to make a
number of independent fixes. Some are laudable, some not, and
some are hard to get excited about one way or the other. I will
not attempt a blow-by-blow review, but a few of the changes are
worthy of special note.
Option 1 would repeal section 707(c) guaranteed payments.
Thus, payments to a partner would either have to fall under the
third party rules of section 707(a) or the regular rules for
distributions to partners of section 731. Section 707(c) has always
been a bit of an odd duck, trying to split the difference between
sections 707(a) and 731, and it is a code provision Subchapter K
can live without. So this is a change that makes sense.
Section 736 would also be repealed. This is perhaps my least
favorite code section in all of Subchapter K It works very
awkwardly and under limited circumstances permits quick
deductions for payments for goodwill. "[T]ime has passed section
736 by, and, rather than serve its initial purpose, section 736

& MEANS, 113TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND
PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES (2013) [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION], available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_sm_bus_passthrough_technical_expla
nation_ 03_12_13. pdf.
128 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY (2014) [hereinafter TRA 2014],
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_
section_summary_finaL022614.pdf.
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survives as an anachronism preventing the coherent evolution of
the Code."129 This is another laudable change.
Less laudable is the provision that would make section 754
elections mandatory, with a few twists in the case of their
application of section 734(b). Mandatory section 754 elections,
while more theoretically pristine, can pose a large burden on
business, especially small business. At a minimum, small
partnerships should be excluded.
.
Option 1 would also eliminate the current seven-year
window for mixing bowl transactions under sections 704(c)(1)(B)
and 737. This would pose a major recordkeeping burden, perhaps
an impossible one, on partnerships, especially small
partnerships. It is also very difficult to justify on policy grounds.
The seven-year window is already quite long and should stop
almost all mixing bowl tax games. This provision of Option 1
fixes a non-problem.
B.

Option 2
If one wanted to come up with an option that would make no
one happy, be opposed by almost everyone, and have no chance of
ever being enacted, it would be hard to do better than Option 2. A
respected commentator has called it a "good starting point for the
tax reform debate."13o I fear that this view is too optimistic. It is
hard to get a debate going when the House Ways and Means
Committee comes out with a proposal most of which hardly
anyone will want. Any serious counterproposal would be
substantially different, making compromise very difficult.
Option 2 often refers to its new Subchapter K entity as a
"passthrough," and I will use the same nomenclature. Option 2
has many Subchapter K-like provisions. There are equivalents or
near equivalents to sections 704(c), 704(d), 705, 706, 707(a) and
(b), 708, 721,131 722, 723, 724, and 751. Option 2 eliminates
special allocations, as I noted above, a valuable benefit to
legitimate business undertakings. It requires a partner's
distributive share to be fixed within each of three
categories: ordinary items, capital items, and tax credits (it does

129 Philip F. Postlewaite & Adam H. Rosenzweig, Anachronisms in Subchapter K of
the Internal Revenue Code: Is It Time to Part with Section 736?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 379,
380 (2006).
130 Monte A. Jackel, An Initial Look at Camp's Small Business Proposals, 138 TAX
NOTES 1363, 1363 (2013).
131 Note that inasmuch as Option 2 follows current section 721, owners do not have to
meet section 351-like control requirements when contributing assets to a partnership. See
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127, at 48.
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not have to be the same across the categories).132 An owner's
distributive share must be consistent with the owner's economic
interest. The owner's economic interest is to be determined under
all facts and circumstances. One might think that without special
allocations, owners likely would usually have straightforward,
fixed allocation percentages that would not impose large
compliance problems. But owners might try to end-run the rules
by having allocations vary from year to year. Further, it is
unclear how a service partner receiving a future profits interest
would calculate his economic interest. Thus, we could expect
some fairly complex regulations on determining an owner's
economic interest. 133 Option 2 does not address capital accounts.
They likely would still be necessary to determine an owner's
economic interest.l 34 Further guidance will be necessary in this
regard. How does the taxpayer determine her capital account
when an entity converts from, for example, Subchapter S to new
Subchapter K? In my proposals, I address this by having the
electing entity go through a deemed liquidation/reformation
process. The bottom line, though, is that eliminating special
allocations is likely a deal killer.
Option 2 adopts the equivalent of current sections 301(b)(1),
(c)(2), (c)(3), and 311. Thus, as would be the case in a distribution
from an S or C corporation, the passthrough recognizes a gain,
but not a loss, on the distribution of property. The owner
recognizes a capital gain if the fair market value of the
distributed property exceeds her basis in the ownership interest
(subject to the equivalent of section 751(b». A loss could be
recognized on liquidation of the ownership interest. In the case of
a gain asset, the owner typically takes a fair market value basis
in the distributed property. In the case of a loss asset, the owner
typically takes a carryover basis. As under current section
732(a)(2), the owner cannot take a greater basis in the
distributed property than she had as an outside basis in the
ownership interest plus any gain recognized by the owner on the
distribution. Logically, the outside basis is reduced by the basis
taken in the distributed property, but not below zero. In fairness,
requiring gain recognition would eliminate some "game playing"
that takes place now and much of the need for mixing bowl rules.
Indeed, Option 2 contains no analog to sections 704(c)(1)(B) or

132 Id. at 45. Exceptions are made for contributed property, to which the equivalent of
section 704(c) will apply, and section 751-like rules designed to preserve a partner's share
of ordinary income. Id. at 45-47; see also I.R.C. § 751(a) (2012).
133 See Jackel, supra note 130, at 1366.
134 See Willard B. Taylor, Subchapter S Out the Window? What Is Going On?, 139 TAX
NOTES 1051 (2013).
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737, though it has a version of section 707(a)(2)(B). The
requirement that gain be recognized on a distribution will be
very unpopular, though perhaps not the deal killer that
eliminating special allocations likely is.
Option 2 makes what is now a section 754 election
mandatory. Again, this would be very burdensome for, and
unpopular with, small business and could evolve into a major
recordkeeping headache. Option 2 reconfigures the equivalent of
section 734(b) in a way that makes it more accurate than the
current version, albeit in a highly complex way.l35 Of course, this
additional complexity will make life just that much harder for
small business.
In what appears to be a major, but sad, nod to current 8
corporation users, Option 2 may be continuing the ability to
avoid self-employment taxes. I say may be, because the language
is cryptic and at dramatic disjuncture with the position TRA
2014 takes. Option 2 states: ''The [new section 707(a)] also
applies when an owner performs services for the passthrough
and is paid reasonable compensation, including wages, by the
passthrough for such services." If indeed this language is meant
to continue self-employment tax avoidance, it would go a long
way to appeasing current 8 corporation users, but for the reasons
noted above, would constitute terrible tax policy. Also, there are
likely many in Congress, especially on the Democratic side of the
aisle, who would resist this approach. 80 while it adds allies, it
also adds opponents. It is also not clear how this effort, without
more, would work. How would Option 2 passthroughs be treated
under section 1402? 8ection 1402 does not contemplate them, of
course, and without amendments to section 1402, it is not an
inevitability that the pass-through "wage payments" would be
respected for self-employment tax purposes to the extent wage
payments from 8 corporations may be. A court might conclude
that the passthrough should be treated as a partnership under
section 1402. It would be thus necessary to amend section 1402.
That would have the benefit of bringing the issue to a head. But
that likely is exactly what current users of 8 corporations do not
want, as it would be very difficult to justify the avoidance of
self-employment taxes. Thus, what looks like a provision 8
corporation users might support could end up being one that also
causes them to oppose Option 2. However, perhaps the implied
nod to self-employment tax avoidance was unintended, because
TRA 2014 addresses this issue directly and very differently, as I
discuss below.
135

See Jackel, supra note 130, at 1366.
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Option 2 has the equivalent of current section 707(b)(2).
Thus, the capital gain freeze technique discussed above that is
currently available with S corporations would no longer be
available. This would endear the new provisions to almost no one
(with the possible exception of a few law professors).
It adds the equivalent of current section 752, albeit one that
is short on details. 136 As noted, its absence from Subchapter S
had at times been a major problem for S corporation
shareholders. So this would be a plus for them, but neutral to
those operating under Subchapter K.
Option 2 permits most non-publicly traded C corporations 137
to elect the new Subchapter K. There are few other limits. In
contrast with current Subchapter S, there is no limit on the
number of shareholders, classes of ownership interest, or who
may be a shareholder. Indeed, there is not even a requirement
that the corporation be domestic. This election must be counted
as a plus, as is the way it addresses existing double taxation
issues, following current sections 1368 and 1374. An electing C
corporation's earnings and profits would carryover to the new
entity, which would be required to keep an accumulated
adjustment account. Distributions in excess of that account
would be treated as dividends to the extent of erstwhile earnings
and profits. If the corporation sells assets it held while a C
corporation within five years of election of the new Subchapter K,
it must recognize a corporate level gain (and pay tax on that gain
at the highest corporate tax rate) to the extent of the net gains
inherent in corporate assets at the time of the election. If an S
corporation elects the new Subchapter K, and current section
1374 applied to the S corporation, the new Subchapter K's section
1374 equivalent will apply. But the new passthrough gets credit
against the five years for so much of that time period as applied
while under the old rules. (Note that Option 2 reduces the
current ten-year section 1374 window to five years.)
Option 2 continues current section 1375 and assesses a
corporate level tax at the highest rate on excess passive
investment income, if the passthrough has earnings and profits
from its C corporation days. However, the current law threshold
of 25% of gross receipts is increased to 60%.
Strikingly, Option 2 does not discuss the receipt of an
ownership interest for services. Generally, currently the receipt
See id. at 1364.
Insurance companies, current or former domestic international sales corporations,
and most banks may not make the election. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 127,
at 43.
136
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of a pure, future partnership profits interest for services is not
income, while the receipt of stock in an S corporation is.13S This is
a highly controversial area, and certainly any new Subchapter K
would need to address this issue.
Last, but far from least, Option 2 assesses a withholding tax
on the passthrough based on an owner's distributive share of net
ordinary income and net capital gains. The withholding
percentage is not specified and can be different for ordinary
income and capital gains if the owner's distributive shares are
different. This would likely only come in second to eliminating
special allocations for unpopularity. It is doubtless a
well-intended measure to increase compliance, and indeed,
improving compliance is a laudable objective. But there is a limit
to how many unpopular measures you can load into a given tax
act and expect to succeed. Option 2 is way past that limit.
Most current non public C corporations that cannot qualify
for current Subchapter S will find something to cheer about in
Option 2. But there is little in Option 2 which would enthuse
either a current Subchapter K or current Subchapter S
supporter. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to see how
Option 2 ever gets off the dime. But, as I noted above, it also
constitutes a major impediment for other systemic reform
proposals which likely would be at substantial variance with
Option 2.
C.

TRA 2014
A law professor could spend several years writing law review
articles about this massive legislative proposal which takes no
prisoners. Luckily, here I can be fairly brief. One overarching
comment: While there is much I do not agree with in TRA 2014,
one cannot fairly claim the drafters just played favorites. They
took on some of the sacred cows of the wealthy. Also note that
TRA 2014 retains both Subchapters K and S with changes and
makes no attempt to implement Option 2.
One of the sacred cows that TRA 2014 takes on is the use of
S corporations to avoid self-employment taxes. At the same time,
the drafters make an attempt to address the problem of
distinguishing income from services from income from capital.
Under TRA 2014,139 self-employment taxes would apply to
general and limited partners of a partnership (including limited
138 See I.R.C. § 83 (2012); Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675, 29,680 (May 24, 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as
amended 2014).
139 TRA 2014, supra note 128, § 1502, at 32-33.
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liability companies), as well as to shareholders of an
S corporation to the extent of their distributive share of the
entity's income or loss (except for Excluded Income). Partners
and S corporation shareholders who materially participate 140 in
the trade or business of the partnership or S corporation would
treat 70% of their combined compensation and distributive share
of the entity's income as net earnings from self-employment (and
thus subject to self-employment taxes), and the remaining 30%
as earnings on invested capital not subject to those taxes. For
partners and S corporation shareholders who do not materially
participate in the trade or business (TRA 2014 calls them, not
always correctly, passive investors), none of the income would be
subject to self-employment taxes.
The TRA 2014 Discussion Draft states that this distinction
between net earnings from self-employment and other income
reflects the fact that over the last several decades, the portion of
GDP attributable to labor has remained remarkably constant at
approximately 70%, while the portion of GDP attributable to
capital has held steady at roughly 30%.
I believe that the drafters are to be commended both for
taking on the use of S corporations to avoid self-employment
taxes, and for attempting to distinguish income from services
from income from capital. An across-the-board 70% / 30% split
certainly has the advantage of setting a bright line. But, as I
discussed above, for most service businesses, almost no income
will come from capital, yet 30% will not be subject to
self-employment taxes. For capital intensive businesses, 30%
may be wildly low. A bright line that, likely more often than not,
is at great disjuncture from reality, cannot be justified. The more
nuanced approach like the one I suggest above is more likely to
get to the right answer more often.
TRA 2014 also contains changes for tax partnerships and S
corporations. For the most part, the TRA 2014 changes track
Option 1 discussed above. One startling departure, however, is
that TRA 2014 would repeal section 708. ''Thus, [a] partnership
would be treated as continuing even if more than 50 percent of
the total capital and profits interests of the partnership are sold
or exchanged, and new elections would not be required or
permitted" (as they are currently).l41 No explanation was given

140 This term is taken from section 469, containing the so-called "passive loss rules."
See I.R.C. § 469(c)(1)(B). Material participation is defined in Treasury Regulation section
1.469-5T in various ways. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (1996). One way to materially
participate is to participate in an activity over 500 hours per year.
141 TRA 2014, supra note 128, § 3619, at 119.

132

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

for this change, and it could be accused of fIxing something that
is not broken. It makes little sense to bind a partnership to
elections it made when it had an entirely different set of
partners. Indeed, repealing section 708 would often make it
difficult to find parties to buy partnership interests. It is true
that Option 1 eliminates some elections, but hardly all, and it is
difficult to see this change as anything other than mystifying.
Another substantial, and vastly more defensible, addition to
Option 1 is a new rule for carried interests. Fully engaging this
topic would require a separate article, but suffice it to say that
currently, partners performing services for investment
partnerships are often able to have income from their services
classified as capital gains. TRA 2014 takes on this sacred cow
and classifies the income as ordinary in many circumstances. 142
TRA 2014 has no chance of ever being enacted. But, unlike
Option 2, which as noted above might stifle discussion and
reform, the boldness of TRA 2014 and its willingness to play
hardball may indeed encourage discussion of important tax
issues. With a little luck, TRA 2014 may jump-start genuine,
large-scale tax reform.
CONCLUSION

While neither Option 2 of the Camp proposals nor TRA 2014
is politically realistic, the repeal of Subchapter S is likely possible
if the use of S corporations for self-employment tax avoidance is
stopped. The repeal of Subchapter S will make the U.S. tax
system more effIcient. The country does not need two
pass-through business entity tax regimes, and only the repeal of
Subchapter S is politically realistic. A few relatively modest Code
changes permit the important, defensible benefits of Subchapter
S to be retained. The repeal of Subchapter S allows the Service to
make better use of its personnel. It also makes for readier reform
of Subchapter K The Treasury and Congress, their attention no
longer divided between two tax systems, and their limited human
resources no longer spread as thin, can bring greater focus to
that task. Finally, the time has come to allow nonpublic
C corporations to elect Subchapter K as well, ideally on a
taxpayer-friendly basis. Shareholders should not be trapped with
an antiquated choice.

142 Id. § 3621, at 120; see also Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2008). See generally Adam H.
Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 713
(2009); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 715 (2008).

